Fault Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography CRYSTAL-Kyber Implementations
Project ID:
P23_24
Principal Investigator:
Dr. Yunsi Fei
Email:
Co-Principal Investigator(s):
N/A
Topic Areas:
Architecture Side-Channels, Encryption Security
Abstract
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has gained significant attention in recent years, mainly due to the growing concern over the potential threats posed by quantum computers to traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC. CRYSTALS-Kyber is a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) designed to resist both classical and quantum computers. It can be implemented on commodity processors or specialized hardware to secure network traffic by encryption and establishing shared key. However, standard Kyber implementations are still susceptible to side-channel attacks, specifically power/electromagnetic side channels and fault attacks. In Year 1, we have investigated new power/EM side-channel attacks on Kyber to retrieve the secret key. In this Year 2, we propose to investigate fault attacks on Kyber.