In this project, we propose to develop a mitigation solution against malicious hardware modifications (a.k.a., hardware Trojans) which introduce covert communication channels in wireless networks. Wireless devices are designed to operate within a bounded space whose margins are determined by the specification limits of integrated circuits (ICs), wireless communication standards, as well as expected operating conditions. However, the operation region of a manufactured device at a given time is centered around a single point in this bounded space, leaving unused margins which an attacker may exploit to introduce a covert communication channel that can exfiltrate sensitive information. To thwart this threat, the proposed defense exploits concepts from chaos theory, wireless communications and tunable circuits to occupy these operational margins and, thereby, hinder Trojan operation. In essence, our solution seeks to guide the wireless device to operate within this bounded space in a chaotic manner, leaving no room for hardware Trojans to establish a covert communication channel. Leveraging prior work conducted by the PI and Co-PI, which includes a variety of hardware Trojan attacks on an 802.11a/g wireless link implemented on a actual hardware experimentation platform, the proposed 1-year effort will focus on: (i) development of a defense framework consisting of a tuning algorithm and performance control knobs to randomize the operating point of a wireless device, (ii) development of a tuning algorithm that utilizes chaos theory and wireless channel noise to create a truly-random knob control mechanism, (iii) theoretical analysis of the proposed defense against known malicious hardware modifications that introduce covert wireless channels, and (iv) experimental evaluation of the proposed method in silencing covert channels without deteriorating the legitimate communication link.