We propose to investigate the design of covert analog devices, i.e., devices which are misidentified by the standard tools used in analog design and verification and can therefore be used as hardware security primitives to facilitate attacks or defenses. As a proof of concept that such covert analog devices are possible, the PI’s team has recently designed, fabricated in silicon and demonstrated unconventional NMOS and PMOS transistors which are perceived as resistors by Layout vs Schematic verification tools (LVS). Covertness of these devices offers an array of possibilities which can be leveraged by hardware security and trust methods. For example, the PI’s team has demonstrated in silicon that these covert transistors can be used to implement an operational amplifier, which LVS misinterprets as a delay element. On the attack side, covert analog devices and circuits can be used to establish or to trigger hardware Trojans. On the defense side, they can be used to hide functionality or to prevent unauthorized use of analog integrated circuits. In general covertness is a powerful attribute with far-reaching implications in security and trust. Therefore, this project seeks to further understand the space of possibilities for designing such covert analog devices, as well as the role they can play as hardware security primitives.